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NOTES
The Slippery Slope of Ski Tort Reform: Will the Judiciary
Uphold Legislative Intent? — Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain
Ski Area, Inc.
I. Introduction
Give ski areas the courage to reduce the risks that they can,
skiers the strength to accept those that they cannot, and juries the
wisdom to know the difference.1
As evidenced by the 2004 presidential election campaign, recent talks of
tort reform have garnered political support.2 Because tort reform has occurred
often in the past, the issue in passing tort reform acts is usually not whether
there is majoritarian support for the acts. Rather, after the passage of the acts,
the issue is whether the judiciary will follow the intent of legislatures by
upholding the reform acts, or simply allow a cause of action to proceed despite
a legislature’s intent and attempt at reform. Thus far, legislatures have made
many attempts at tort reform ranging from veterinary malpractice to sports
related injuries, including skiing injuries.3
One particular area of tort reform is the liability that a ski area provider has
to its patrons. Since the 1960s, skiing has emerged as a significant sport and
a rather large tourist industry for many states in the country.4 During the 20032004 ski season, there were 57.1 million visits to ski resorts, the third best
performance in U.S. ski industry history.5 During the same ski season, the

1. Beth Robinson, Playing It Safe: Allocating the Risk of Harm on the Slopes, VT. B.J. &
L. DIG., Mar. 1999, at 15, 15.
2. See generally KaiserEDU.org, Health Care and the 2004 Election, http://www.
kaiseredu.org/topics_im.asp?imID=1&parentID=61&id=124 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); The
Second Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate Transcript (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://www.
debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html (explaining how both party candidates propose some type
of reform to decrease the cost of malpractice insurance for doctors).
3. See generally Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 479 (2004); Erica K. Rosenthal, Inside the Lines: Basing Negligence Liability in Sports for
Safety-Based Rule Violations on the Level of Play, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2631 (2004).
4. Arthur N. Frakt & Janna S. Rankin, Surveying the Slippery Slope: The Questionable
Value of Legislation to Limit Ski Area Liability, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 227, 236 (1992).
5. News Release, Thomas B. Doyle, Nat’l Ski & Snowboard Retailers Ass’n, Areas
Report Notes Slopes Trends (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.nssra.com/2001/nssra/index.asp?
centre=article&recno=2619.
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average gross sales per resort totaled $18.77 million.6 Considering the amount
of money that the ski industry generates for its respective states, the ski
industry’s ability to lobby for legislative reform comes as no surprise.
Under the common law theory of volenti non fit injuria,7 a ski area provider
owes no duty to protect a patron from injuries resulting from skiing.8 Wright
v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc.9 best demonstrates this concept in that the court
found that the ski area provider had a duty to warn patrons of dangers that the
provider could have reasonably foreseen and corrected but did not have a duty
to warn of the dangers inherent in the sport of skiing such as a tree stump
covered by snow.10
As the law regarding skiing liability slowly evolved, legislatures placed
more duties on the provider, but most state legislatures also passed
comparative negligence laws that confused primary and secondary assumption
of risk.11 This confusion not only made it more difficult to define the
provider’s duties, but the confusion also made it more difficult to determine
when the law placed no duty whatsoever on the provider, thus preventing
recovery.12 Also, in Sunday v. Stratton Corp.,13 the court held that because of
the ski area provider’s representations concerning the condition of its slopes
and the new technology that allowed for better cleaning of the slopes, brush
hidden by snow was not an inherent risk in the sport of skiing.14 Fearing the
6. Rick Kahl, Economic Analysis: Profits Still Strong, SKI AREA MANAGEMENT, May
2005, at 56, available at http://www.saminfo.com/issues/article.php?tid=3363.
7. “He who consents cannot receive an injury.” Cathy Hansen & Steve Duerr,
Recreational Injuries & Inherent Risks: Wyoming’s Recreation Safety Act, 28 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 149, 150 n.1 (1993) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (4th ed. 1968)).
8. Id. at 150. Justice Cardozo issued one of the most famous statements on volenti non
fit injuria:
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as
they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his
antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball. The
antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric. The rough and
boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own guffaws, but they are
not the pleasures of tranquility. The plaintiff was not seeking a retreat for
meditation. Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers
when he made his chance to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, with
whatever damage to his body might ensue from such a fall. The timorous may
stay at home.
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (1929) (citations omitted).
9. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
10. Id. at 791; see also Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 154.
11. See Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 150-51.
12. Id.
13. 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978).
14. Id. at 401-03; see also Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 161.
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end of the inherent risk doctrine in the sport of skiing, the ski industry sought
a legislative response, thus most states with a ski industry passed legislative
reform.15 In particular, Connecticut passed a statute that the legislature
designed to codify the inherent risk doctrine in the sport of skiing.16 Despite
statutory language to the contrary, however, in Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain
Ski Area, Inc.,17 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not
assume the risk of a collision with a ski instructor because the instructor was
under the presumed control of the ski area operator at all times.18
This note examines how one state court addressed one example of tort
reform, ski tort reform, to determine whether the judiciary might upset the
intent of tort reform legislation. This note argues that the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s decision in Jagger ignored the state legislature’s intent to
reform the common law principles of ski tort liability by interpreting statutory
tort reform in the ski area industry as merely codifying the preexisting
common law principles. Part II of this note analyzes and discusses the judicial
decisions and legislative responses to those decisions before the Jagger case.
Part III gives the facts and procedural history of Jagger, and Part IV discusses
the majority and dissenting opinions in Jagger. Finally, Part V analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the court’s rationale and makes reforming
suggestions for the Connecticut ski industry and other states with such
industries.
II. Law Leading Up to the Jagger Case
A. Traditional Concept of Ski Tort Liability
Skiing accidents have resulted in the litigation of many personal injury
cases.19 Voluntary assumption of risk and contributory negligence dominated
personal injury law when skiing was gaining popularity during the 1950s and
60s, giving little recourse to injured skiers.20 The difference between primary
and secondary assumption of risk was important in the analysis of personal
injury cases involving ski tort liability:
The term “assumption of risk,” often misused, actually
designates two distinct concepts: primary assumption of risk and
15. Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 150.
16. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-211 to -214 (2001).
17. 849 A.2d 813 (Conn. 2004).
18. Id. at 828.
19. Until the 1960s, equipment tended to be crude and somewhat dangerous. Frakt &
Rankin, supra note 4, at 236.
20. Id. at 237.
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secondary assumption of risk. While both concepts operate to
relieve the defendant of liability, primary assumption of risk does
so by recognizing the defendant did not owe a duty of reasonable
care to the plaintiff. . . . Secondary assumption of risk . . . is a form
of contributory negligence. The secondary assumption of risk
analysis . . . ask[s] whether a reasonably prudent person in the
exercise of due care would have incurred the known risk the
plaintiff incurred.21
In other words, under a primary assumption of risk analysis, the court asks
whether the defendant owed a duty to the skier. Under a secondary
assumption of risk analysis, the court assumes that the defendant had a duty
toward the skier, and it assumes that the defendant breached that duty. The
court, however, seeks to determine whether the skier, knowing that the
defendant breached its duty, chose to confront the known risk. Primary
assumption of risk traditionally guided litigation in the ski industry because the
issue was whether the ski area provider had a duty to provide reasonable care
to an injured skier.22 Although secondary assumption of risk, and thus
contributory negligence, was a complete defense for a ski area provider, courts
recognized the necessity of balancing the interests of ski area providers and the
interests of skiers by defining “resort liability in light of the skier’s recognition
and voluntary assumption of certain dangers intrinsic in the sport.”23 Hence,
courts sought to limit the ski area provider’s liability based upon known risks
that inhere to the sport of skiing.
In Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., essentially the first case concerning ski
resort liability, the District Court of Vermont stated that if the plaintiff’s
injuries were the result of a risk that inheres in the sport of skiing, the ski
operator owed no legal duty to skiers and could not be held liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries.24 The plaintiff in Wright skied into a snow-covered stump
that the ski operator failed to previously remove.25 The court held for the ski
operator, stating that the plaintiff had assumed a risk that was an integral part
of the sport of skiing.26

21. Paige Bigelow, Recent Development, Ski Resort Liability for Negligence Under Utah’s
Inherent Risks of Skiing Statute, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 311, 313-14 (footnotes omitted).
22. Wendy Faber, Comment, Utah’s Inherent Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 355, 359.
23. Id.
24. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96. F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Vt. 1951); see also Hansen
& Duerr, supra note 7, at 158.
25. Wright, 96 F. Supp. at 787.
26. Id. at 791; see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 237.
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Over the next few decades, cases across the country conformed to the ruling
in Wright.27 In Leopold v. Okemo Mountain,28 the plaintiff, an expert skier,
collided with the unpadded concrete base of a ski lift tower while skiing.29
Although the ski area operator faced no undue burden by padding the base of
the lift tower,30 the court held that the plaintiff was in a better position than the
defendant to decide whether to assume the consequences of skiing when those
consequences were plain and apparent; accordingly, the court ruled in the
defendant’s favor.31
Wright’s influence is further exemplified in Kaufman v. State.32 In
Kaufman, the plaintiff fell on a rocky bare spot — a rocky area with very little
or no snow — located on a slope at the defendant’s ski area.33 Even though
the court stated that the operator had a duty to warn of “reasonably
unforeseeable danger involving unreasonable risks, of which the owner has
knowledge,”34 the court cited Wright and found that the proximate cause of the
injury was not a breach of the operator’s duty.35 Falling in this manner was a
foreseeable risk, and the plaintiff failed to prove that the operator exercised
unreasonable care and “to prove himself [sic] free from contributory
negligence causing or proximately contributing to his accident and injuries.”36
Juries also tended to agree with the principle that a skier must assume some
risks inherent in the sport of skiing.37 This agreement among juries, consisting
of lay citizens, demonstrates the public’s acceptance that some activities, such
as skiing, involve certain known risks. In La Vine v. Clear Creek Skiing
Corp.,38 an employee of the defendant ski resort collided with the plaintiff.39
The jury ruled for the ski resort, and the court of appeals upheld the jury
verdict, concluding that “the jury in a ski slope case tends to view the entire
skiing scene as one involving a high degree of hazard in which the skier
assumes a degree of risk by merely taking to the slopes.”40 The seemingly
27. See, e.g., Daniely v. Goldmine Ski Assocs., Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990); Green v. Sherburne Corp., 403 A.2d 278 (Vt. 1979).
28. 420 F. Supp. 781 (D. Vt. 1976).
29. Id. at 782-85; see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 237.
30. Leopold, 420 F. Supp. at 787.
31. Id.
32. 172 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1958).
33. Id. at 278; see also Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 159.
34. Kaufman, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 285.
37. Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 238.
38. 557 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 732; see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 238.
40. La Vine, 557 F.2d at 735.
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settled issue regarding the scope of liability of ski area providers, however,
was about to change.
B. Sunday v. Stratton Corp.: The “‘Shot Heard Round the World’” of
Skiing41
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Vermont’s decision in Sunday v. Stratton
Corp.42 changed the way the nation’s skiing industry viewed its potential
liability. Most saw Sunday as repudiating the doctrine established in Wright, a
doctrine that courts had accepted and followed for decades.43 The facts in
Sunday were similar to those in Wright in that concealed objects on groomed
trails injured both plaintiffs.44 Because of new methods of grooming
technology, however, the court in Sunday could not accept that brush concealed
by loose snow was an inherent danger of skiing.45 The court in Sunday
attempted to distinguish Wright by stating that brush or a stump covered by
snow on a “novice” trail was not a necessary and inherent risk of skiing.46 This
statement, however, further contradicted the Wright decision because the trail in
question in Wright was also a novice trail, and the Wright court determined that
the stump was an integral risk of skiing on a novice trail.47
In addition to potentially repudiating Wright, the Sunday court also
distinguished between primary and secondary assumption of risk.48 The court
held that the secondary assumption of risk doctrine was only a phase of
contributory negligence, and its application was irrelevant in the analysis
because the judge had instructed the jury concerning comparative negligence.49
According to the court, primary assumption of risk was not applicable because
the ski area treated the skier as an invitee.50 Therefore, the ski area provider had
to exercise “reasonable care to keep its premises in a safe and suitable
condition. . . . If a hidden danger existed, known to defendant, but unknown and
41. Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 242 (with alterations in capitalization) (quoting BETTY
SMISSEN, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
ENTITIES § 8.4, at 77 (1990)).
42. 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978).
43. See, e.g., Collins v. Schweitzer, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Idaho 1991); Mastro v.
Petrick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
44. Faber, supra note 22, at 355.
45. Sunday, 390 A.2d at 402; see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 243.
46. Sunday, 390 A.2d at 402; see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 243. Ironically, the
Vermont Supreme Court later repudiated the sharp distinction it made when comparing Sunday
and Wright. See generally Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 641 A.2d 765 (Vt. 1994).
47. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786, 789 (D. Vt. 1951).
48. Sunday, 390 A.2d at 403-04.
49. Id.; see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 243.
50. Sunday, 390 A.2d at 402-03.
VAN DER
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not reasonably apparent to the plaintiff, it was [defendant’s] duty to give warning
of it to the latter.”51 Accordingly, the court held that the ski area provider failed
to exercise reasonable care in keeping the slopes clear of obstructions in light of
the new technology available in 1978 — a technology that was not available in
1951 when Wright was decided — and in light of the fact that the ski area
provider advertised pristine slopes as one of its characteristics.52 The world of
skiing quickly reacted.
C. Legislative Response to the Sunday Decision
Following the Sunday decision, lobbyists and representatives of ski area
operators petitioned for legislative change regarding ski tort liability, and within
three years of the decision, the legislatures of almost every state with a skiing
industry passed or were considering a “‘ski responsibility act.’”53 These state
statutes basically provide that ski area operators are not liable for an injury that
is a foreseeable aspect, or inherent risk, of the sport of skiing.54 Generally, the
states’ statutes list the following inherent risks: variations in weather, terrain, and
snow conditions; and collisions with lift towers, other man-made structures, and
other skiers.55 Additionally, these statutes usually state that a ski resort will not
be liable for “‘a skier’s failure to ski within the limits of the skier’s ability.’”56
Courts have tended to interpret these statutes in favor of ski area operators.57
Although the statutes of several ski states, such as Utah,58 Colorado,59 and
New Mexico,60 follow the common trend stated above, some state statutes
provide exceptions to these general guidelines. For example, Maine61 helps ski
area operators only by shortening the statute of limitations. This shortening of
the statute of limitations helps ski operators by limiting the amount of time an
injured patron would have to bring suit. In another example of a deviation from
the common trend, the Supreme Court of Montana found the first draft of the
Montana statute62 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
at 251.
62.

Id. at 402 (second alteration in original); see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 243.
Sunday, 390 A.2d at 401.
Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 250 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (repealed 1994)).
Id. at 252-57.
See generally UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -53 (2002).
See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -114 (West 2001).
See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (LexisNexis 2004).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15,217 (2003); see also Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-733 to -736 (2002).
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Montana State Constitution.63 The Supreme Court of Montana determined that
despite a legitimate state interest in protecting the ski industry, the Equal
Protection Clause forbid the legislature from singling out skiers by prohibiting
them from obtaining legal recourse if the ski area operator proximately caused
the skier’s injury.64 This unequal protection was especially apparent given that
the Montana legislature did not create a similar statute that applied to other
participants in inherently dangerous activities, such as mountain climbing and
bicycling.65 Essentially, the court decided that the passage of the Montana ski
statute was “an attempt to go back to the old law of negligence which provided
in Montana that a person who was in any way contributorially [sic] negligent
was barred from recovery.”66
Like other states, the Connecticut legislature’s response to Sunday was swift.67
Four statutes comprise Connecticut’s ski tort reform. Section 29-211 of the
Connecticut General Statutes lists the responsibilities of the ski area operator.68
Under this section, ski area operators must mark all areas of possible danger to
its patrons (including the location of maintenance vehicles and the intersection
63. Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 250-51 (discussing Brewer v. Skilift, Inc., 762 P.2d
226, 230 (Mont. 1988)).
64. Brewer, 762 P.2d at 230-31.
65. Id. at 230.
66. Id.
67. For a legislative history of the Connecticut ski statutes, see Jagger v. Mohawk
Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 849 A.2d 813, 835 (Conn. 2004).
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-211 (2001). The statute reads:
In the operation of a passenger tramway or ski area, each operator shall have the
obligation to perform certain duties including, but not limited to: (1) Conspicuously
marking all trail maintenance vehicles and furnishing the vehicles with flashing or
rotating lights which shall be operated whenever the vehicles are working or moving
within the skiing area; (2) conspicuously marking the location of any hydrant or
similar device used in snow-making operations and placed on a trail or slope; (3)
conspicuously marking the entrance to each trail or slope with a symbol, adopted or
approved by the National Ski Areas Association, which identifies the relative degree
of difficulty of such trail or slope or warns that such trail or slope is closed; (4)
conspicuously marking all lift towers within the confines of any trail or slope; (5)
maintaining one or more trail boards at prominent locations within the ski area
displaying such area’s network of ski trails and slopes, designating each trail or slope
in the same manner as in subdivision (3) and notifying each skier that the wearing
of ski retention straps or other devices used to prevent runaway skis is required by
this section, section 29-201 and sections 29-212 to 29-214, inclusive; (6) in the event
maintenance men or equipment are being employed on any trail or slope during the
hours at which such trail or slope is open to the public, conspicuously posting notice
thereof at the entrance to such trail or slope; and (7) conspicuously marking trail or
slope intersections.
Id.
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of trails), visibly mark and label the degree of difficulty of each trail, and notify
skiers of devices that aid in preventing runaway skis that could hurt other
skiers.69 Section 29-212 explains the assumption of risk on the part of the
skier.70 This section states that skiers assume the risk of injuries caused by the
following: variations in the terrain of the ski slope, bare spots on the slopes,
conspicuously marked lift towers, objects outside the ski slope, boarding a
tramway71 without informing oneself of how to load and unload from a tramway,
and collisions “with any other person by any skier while skiing.”72 The
assumption of the risk of injury under this section, however, would not apply
when the negligent operation of the ski area caused the injury.73 Section 29-213
lists prohibited conduct that the legislature applied to skiers, such as intentionally
throwing something from the tramway.74 Finally, section 29-214 provides
69. Id.
70. Id. § 29-212. The statute reads:
Each skier shall assume the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to his
person or property arising out of the hazards inherent in the sport of skiing, unless
the injury was proximately caused by the negligent operation of the ski area by the
ski area operator, his agents or employees. Such hazards include, but are not
limited to: (1) Variations in the terrain of the trail or slope which is marked in
accordance with subdivision (3) of section 29-211 or variations in surface or
subsurface snow or ice conditions, except that no skier assumes the risk of
variations which are caused by the operator unless such variations are caused by
snow making, snow grooming or rescue operations; (2) bare spots which do not
require the closing of the trail or slope; (3) conspicuously marked lift towers; (4)
trees or other objects not within the confines of the trail or slope; (5) boarding a
passenger tramway without prior knowledge of proper loading and unloading
procedures or without reading instructions concerning loading and unloading
posted at the base of such passenger tramway or without asking for such
instructions; and (6) collisions with any other person by any skier while skiing.
Id.
71. A tramway is the carrier that travels on the overhead cable and transports the patrons
up and down the ski slopes. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/
dictionary/tram (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-212.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 29-213. The statute reads:
No skier shall: (1) Intentionally drop, throw or expel any object from a passenger
tramway; (2) do any act which shall interfere with the running or operation of a
passenger tramway; (3) use a passenger tramway without the permission of the
operator; (4) place any object in the skiing area or on the uphill track of a
passenger tramway which may cause a skier to fall; (5) cross the track of a J bar
lift, T bar lift, platter pull or similar device or a rope tow, except at a designated
location; (6) depart from the scene of a skiing accident when involved in the
accident without leaving personal identification, including name and address, or
before notifying the proper authorities and obtaining assistance when such skier
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special defenses for ski area operators against certain claims of civil liability
brought by a skier. One such defense, for example, is against skiers who did not
ski within the limits of their own abilities.75 Thus, with the passage of these
statutes, the Connecticut legislature seemingly sought to protect its ski industry.
As the rest of this note demonstrates, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court
removed some of the protection the legislature had given to ski area providers.
III. Statement of the Case: Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc.
In December 1999, plaintiff Mary Ann Jagger suffered a broken leg while
skiing at the Mohawk Mountain Ski Area (Mohawk Mountain).76 Allegedly,
James Courtot, an employee of Mohawk Mountain, injured her when he
collided with her from behind.77 On the day of the collision, Courtot was
participating in Mohawk Mountain’s onsite preseason clinic, designed to train
ski instructors.78 Courtot was not providing ski instruction to Jagger or
interacting with her in any way when the collision occurred.79 As a result of
the collision, Jagger sustained personal injuries, which she claimed both
Courtot and Mohawk Mountain negligently caused.80
Jagger sued both Courtot and Mohawk Mountain in a diversity suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut,81 alleging two claims. First,
knows that any other skier involved in the accident is in need of medical or other
assistance; (7) fail to wear retention straps or other devices used to prevent
runaway skis.
Id.
75. Id. § 29-214. The statute reads:
It shall be a special defense to any civil action against an operator by a skier that
such skier: (1) Did not know the range of his own ability to negotiate any trail or
slope marked in accordance with subdivision (3) of section 29-211; (2) did not ski
within the limits of his own ability; (3) did not maintain reasonable control of
speed and course at all times while skiing; (4) did not heed all posted warnings;
(5) did not ski on a skiing area designated by the operator; or (6) did not embark
on or disembark from a passenger tramway at a designated area. In such civil
actions the law of comparative negligence shall apply.
Id.
76. Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., No. 3:01CV2163, 2002 WL 31433376, at
*1-2 (D. Conn. Sept. 24, 2002). Because the unpublished opinion more explicitly states the
facts, this citation will be used for a recitation of the facts only. The published opinion will be
used for all other parts of the paper.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. James Courtot was a resident of the state of Connecticut, Mohawk Mountain was a
Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut, and Mary Jagger
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she sought damages based on “vicarious liability for Courtot’s conduct and
[Mohawk Mountain’s] own negligence in failing to properly train and
supervise him.”82 Second, she sought damages because the collision “was
caused by Courtot’s negligence in that he was skiing at an unreasonable speed
and failed to keep a lookout, slow down, turn, or stop, although he reasonably
could have done so.”83 In other words, she sued Mohawk Mountain for
vicarious liability and James Courtot for negligently performing his duties.
Mohawk Mountain moved to dismiss, stating that the claim against it was
barred under section 29-212 of the Connecticut General Statutes:
which provides that skiers “assume the risk of and legal
responsibility for any injury . . . arising out of the hazards inherent
in the sport of skiing, unless the injury was proximately caused by
the negligent operation of the ski area by the ski area operator, his
agents or employees” including the hazard of “collisions with any
other person by any skier while skiing.”84
Additionally, Courtot contended that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s ruling
in Jaworski v. Kiernan85 barred any claim against him because the Jaworski
court held that a plaintiff must prove recklessness to create liability for injuries
that occurred from the participation in contact sports; consequently, the court
could not hold him liable upon proof of mere negligence.86
The district court reserved judgment, finding that the negligence of ski area
operators was a public concern and that the Jagger case presented
circumstances which were likely to happen again.87 Consequently, the district
court sought certification88 of the following question directly to the
Connecticut Supreme Court:
Pursuant to [section 29-212 of the Connecticut General Statutes],
does a skier assume the risk of, and legal responsibility for, an
injury arising out of a collision with a ski instructor, acting in the

was a resident of New York. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *1.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-212 (2003) (emphasis added) (first alteration in
original).
85. 696 A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997).
86. Jagger, 2002 WL 31433376, at *1.
87. Id.
88. Certification is allowed under section 51-199b of the Connecticut General Statutes.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199b.
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course of his employment with the ski area operator, when the
collision is caused by the instructor’s negligence?89
The Connecticut Supreme Court answered this question in the negative and
allowed Jagger’s cause of action.90
IV. Discussion of the Case
A. The Majority’s Opinion
The plaintiff made three main contentions in presenting her argument to the
Connecticut Supreme Court.91 First, under section 29-212 of the Connecticut
General Statutes, the phrase “negligent operation of a ski area” applied to all
services offered by the ski operator, including the type of clinic conducted by
Courtot, and should not be limited to those services specifically enumerated
in section 29-211 of the Connecticut General Statutes.92 Second, the plain
language of the statute and its legislative history illustrated that skiers assumed
only the risks inherent in skiing and did not assume any risks arising from a ski
operator’s negligence.93 Finally, even though this was a case of first
impression for the Connecticut Supreme Court, other jurisdictions with similar
statutes concerning ski liability had created a distinction between a collision
“not caused in some manner by a ski area operator or its employees . . . and
collisions somehow caused by the negligence of a[n] operator or its
employees.”94
The defense responded with four contentions of its own.95 First, ski
instruction and preseason clinics were not enumerated in the statutes, and
89. Jagger, 2002 WL 31433376, at *1.
90. Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 849 A.2d 813, 815 n.2 (Conn. 2004). This
note focuses only on one of the certified questions presented to the court. The other question
was “Does the fellow participant immunity against liability for sports injuries caused by
negligence recognized in Jaworski apply to collisions between a skier and a ski instructor
caused by the instructor’s negligence?” Id. (citation omitted). Concerning the second certified
question, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the rule in Jaworski did not apply. Id. at
831. Jaworski stated that in contact sports the plaintiff must prove recklessness, rather than
mere negligence in order to recover damages. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court for several
reasons held that skiing is not a “contact sport,” and therefore, the plaintiff need only prove
negligence. Id. at 832. See generally Jaworski v. Kiernan 696 A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997), for a
more detailed explanation of how Connecticut has ruled on negligence which occurs as part of
a contact sport.
91. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 817.
92. Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-211 to -212 (2003).
93. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 817.
94. Id. at 817-18.
95. Id. at 818.
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therefore, were excluded from the meaning of “operation of a ski area.”96
Second, the statute plainly stated that a ski participant assumed the risk of a
collision with another skier when skiing.97 Third, the legislative history
showed that the legislature intended to place the risks of inherent dangers,
including a collision with another skier, on the participant while confining the
liability of ski operators to negligent operation of the ski area.98 Finally, the
defendant claimed that the decisions of lower Connecticut courts and courts
from other jurisdictions provided persuasive support for the above
contentions.99
The Connecticut Supreme Court began its analysis by stating how courts in
its jurisdiction should interpret statutes.100 According to the court, a court
should determine the meaning of the statute as applied to the factual situation
of the case currently before the court.101 In so doing, the court may look “to
the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances
surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law
principles governing the same general subject matter.”102
Both the plaintiff and the defendant argued that the statute was
unambiguous; therefore, the court needed to follow precedent holding that, in
the case of an unambiguous statute, a court should first use the plain language
of the text to determine the meaning.103 The court disagreed, concluding that
the statute was ambiguous because the statute never defined the phrase
“‘operation of the ski area’ or its operative terms.”104 Consequently, the court
used extra-textual evidence, such as the legislative history and the
circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment, to help it understand and
determine the statute’s meaning.105 The court approached the ultimate issue
by answering two subissues and concluded that (1) ski instruction falls within
the meaning of the phrase “operation of a ski area,” and (2) a skier did not
assume the risk of a collision with a ski instructor who was under the
presumed control of the ski area operator at all times.106
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
2003)).
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield Dev. Corp., 833 A.2d 908, 915 (Conn.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 828.
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1. “Whether Ski Instruction Is an Activity Falling Within the Operation
of a Ski Area by a Ski Area Operator”107
The plaintiff claimed that the term “operation” encompassed all services
offered by the ski operator.108 The defendant ski operator argued that because
section 29-212 did not define the phrase “operation of a ski area,” the
Connecticut Supreme Court should look to the duties listed in section 29-211
as a guide to decide what falls under “operation.”109 All of the duties listed in
section 29-211 essentially relate to marking equipment and trails to provide
skiers with notice of the location of and potential hazards associated with
equipment and trails. Consequently, the defense wanted the phrase “operation
of a ski area” limited to those types of warning activities.110 The ski operator
argued that ski instruction was dissimilar to the duties listed in section 29-211,
and therefore, should not be considered part of the “operation of a ski area.”111
The Jagger court stated that because section 29-212 did not define
“operation of a ski area” and because the legislature presumably created a
consistent body of law, the court may look to other statutes involving similar
matters.112 The court decided section 29-211 uses the word “duties” to
describe “the operation of a ski area” when it states that “‘[i]n the operation
of a . . . ski area, each operator shall have the obligation to perform certain
duties . . . .’”113 The court found that the duties listed in this statute were
simply a subset of the more general operations involved in the “operation of
a ski area” mentioned in section 29-212, so consequently, the section 29-211
duties did not define or provide an exhaustive list of the operations within the
phrase “operation of a ski area.”114 Thus, the court determined that the
legislature did not provide a statutory definition for the phrase.115 Lacking
sufficient statutory guidance, the court decided to consult the dictionary, which
“define[d] the word ‘operation,’ . . . as the whole process of planning for and
operating a business or other organized unit, and as a phase of a business or of
business activity.”116 Accordingly, the court held for the plaintiff, stating that

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-211 to -212 (2003).
Jagger, 849 A.2d at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-211).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1581 (1976 ed.)).
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ski instruction fell under the definition of the statutory phrase “operation of a
ski area.”117
Continuing its use of extra-textual evidence to determine statutory meaning,
the court further stated that the legislative history and purpose behind the
passage of the statute supported the plaintiff’s claim.118 The primary purpose
of the legislation was to outline responsibilities of both ski area operators and
skiers.119 According to the Court, the legislature intended for skiers to assume
certain risks inherent in skiing and outside the control of the ski area operator
and for the ski area operators to reduce risks within their control.120 Thus,
because Courtot’s activities were within the ski operator’s control, the court
determined that ski instruction and preseason clinics should be included under
the definition of the phrase “operation of a ski area.”
2. “Whether a Skier Assumes the Risk of a Collision With a Ski
Instructor”121
Section 29-212 of the Connecticut General Statutes states that “[e]ach skier
shall assume the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to his person . . .
arising out of the hazards inherent in the sport of skiing. . . . Such hazards
include, but are not limited to . . . collisions with any other person by any skier
while skiing.”122 The court understood assumption of risk to act either: (1)
primarily as a defense to a negligence claim because the defendant owed no
duty of care to the plaintiff, or (2) secondarily, as a defense to a negligence
claim because even though the defendant owed and breached a duty of care to
the plaintiff, the defendant was not liable if the plaintiff was aware of the
negligence and the risk involved and chose to face such risk despite this
awareness.123
According to the court, the Connecticut statute fit neither of these
definitions.124 With regard to primary assumption of risk, the statute states that
a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of skiing but does not assume the
risks caused by the operator’s negligence; therefore, because the defendant still
owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the statute did not conform to the definition
of primary assumption of risk.125 In other words, because primary assumption
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-212 (2003).
Jagger, 849 A.2d at 822.
Id.
Id.
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of risk applies only when the defendant does not owe a duty and because the
statute requires a duty of care on the part of the ski area operator, primary
assumption of risk would be inapplicable. Additionally, the court stated that
the statute did not coincide with secondary assumption of risks, because the
statute “presume[d] negligence on the part of the defendant, but nevertheless
disallow[ed] recovery because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to encounter the
known risk,” regardless of whether the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s
negligence.126 For secondary assumption of risk to apply, the plaintiff must be
aware of the defendant’s breach of duty, so section 29-212 would not apply in
a secondary assumption of risk scenario.
To reconcile contradictions between the doctrine of assumption of risk and
the Connecticut General Statutes, the Jagger court determined that a skier only
assumes the inherent risks of skiing over which a ski area operator has no
control or cannot reasonably act to limit such inherent risk.127 Even then, the
court stated that a skier only assumes the risk in the primary sense, thus only
when the ski area provider does not owe a duty — such as when an injury
results from a terrain variation — will the court deem that the skier has
assumed the risks associated with skiing.128 The court explained further:
[C]loser analysis of the statute reveals that § 29-212 provides that
a skier assumes the risk of those hazards over which an operator
has no control or over which an operator cannot reasonably act so
as to ameliorate the potentiality of harm — for such hazards a skier
has assumed the risk in the primary sense and an operator has no
duty to protect skiers with regard to such hazards. . . . Over those
risks which an operator has control, or over which an operator can
act reasonably so as to minimize the existence or level of risk,
however, an operator owes skiers a duty of care and breach of that
duty subjects the operator to liability in negligence under our
settled principles of comparative negligence.129
According to the Jagger court, this interpretation fit within the legislative
history of the statute, which essentially was a response to the differing results
between Wright and Sunday.130 The Jagger court interpreted Wright to state
that a ski area provider did not have a duty to warn skiers of inherent risks,
such as a snow-covered stump, that were out of operator’s control, but the
provider, however, had a duty to warn skiers of risks that were within the ski
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 825.
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area operator’s control, such as leaving a tractor on a ski trail.131 The Jagger
court applied this interpretation to state that, similar to leaving a tractor on a
ski trail, the ski area provider had presumptive control over its employees;
therefore, the court did not consider an employee running into a patron an
inherent risk.132 The Sunday court concluded that modern grooming
techniques should have uncovered the snow-covered brush; therefore, the
concealed brush was not an inherent danger assumed by the skier when
participating in skiing.133 The Connecticut Supreme Court in Jagger
reconciled Sunday and Wright by noting that Sunday did not overrule Wright;
rather, Sunday merely reclassified what risks were within the control of the ski
area provider, considering the advent of new technology.134 Because new
technology allowed the complete removal of brush that existed on a novice ski
trail, a skier was no longer deemed to assume that risk.135
Furthermore, the court found that the intent behind the ski tort reform
legislation passed after the Sunday decision complied with its explanation of
what was within the control of ski area providers. After the Sunday decision,
ski area operators, including those in Connecticut, became concerned with
their new potential liability and sought redress from the state legislatures
throughout the country.136 By looking at the legislative history of the
Connecticut ski tort reform statutes, the court in Jagger concluded that
Connecticut had passed a statute that was in complete harmony with Sunday.137
Additionally, the court found that the statute distinguishes between a risk over
which the operator has no realistic control, such as terrain variations, and a risk
over which the operator has control, such as marking a lift tower so a skier
may know the tower’s location on the course and have the ability to avoid it.138

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court in Sunday explained:
While skiers fall, as a matter of common knowledge, that does not make every fall
a danger inherent in the sport. If the fall is due to no breach of duty on the part of
the defendant, its risk is assumed in the primary sense, and there can be no
recovery. But where the evidence indicates existence or assumption of duty and
its breach, that risk is not one “assumed” by the plaintiff. What he then “assumes”
is not the risk of injury, but the use of reasonable care on the part of the defendant.
Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398, 403 (Vt. 1978).
136. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 824-25.
137. Id. at 825.
138. Id. at 827.
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Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court opined the basis of liability revolves
around a ski operator’s control of certain risks.139
The court relied on the Utah case of Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort140 to
support its position concerning what risks were within control of the ski area
providers.141 Because Utah’s skiing statute is very similar to Connecticut’s
statute, the court found the decision highly persuasive.142 In Clover, the
plaintiff brought a negligent design action against the defendant ski resort.143
The plaintiff alleged that because of the negligent design of the resort, a ski
employee, acting in the course of his employment, collided with the
plaintiff.144 The negligent design involved a “blind jump,” which allows a
skier to jump off a ski run and land below without the ability to see if anyone
is positioned in the landing area. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant ski operator, stating that the plaintiff was injured as
a result of an inherent risk of the sport — running into another skier; therefore,
the claim was statutorily barred because the Utah statute, like its Connecticut
counterpart, stated that running into another skier was an inherent risk of
skiing.145 The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed and held in favor of the
plaintiff, stating, “[T]he inherent risks of skiing are those dangers that skiers
wish to confront as essential characteristics of the sport of skiing or hazards
that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the ski
area operator.”146 The Utah Supreme Court found that a blind jump
negligently located was not an essential characteristic that a skier wished to
confront while skiing, and furthermore, the blind jump’s location was within
the control of the ski area provider.147
Influenced, at least partially by Clover, the Connecticut Supreme Court held
that because ski instruction falls within the “operation of a ski area” and
because the skier did not assume the risk of a collision with a ski instructor
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
Jagger, 849 A.2d at 828.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-52 to -54 (2004).
Jagger, 849 A.2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1046-47 (Utah 1991)).
Clover, 808 P.2d at 1045-47. The Jagger court elaborated:
Thus, for inherent hazards, ski area operators owe skiers no duty of care and skiers
assume the risk of those hazards in the primary sense. For those hazards which
are not an innate part of the sport of skiing, or over which an operator can act
reasonably to eliminate or minimize the potential for harm, operators owe skiers
a duty of reasonable care.
Jagger, 849 A.2d at 828.
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who was under the presumed control of the ski area operator at all times,
Mohawk Mountain could be liable to the plaintiff.148 Therefore, the court held
that a jury should hear the case and decide if Mohawk Mountain was liable.149
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion began by agreeing with the majority opinion on
three points: (1) the claim against Mohawk Mountain was based on vicarious
liability; (2) the statutes were ambiguous; and (3) Connecticut’s conflicting
statutes need “something more” for them to make sense.150 The dissent,
however, criticized the majority’s position that Mohawk Mountain had
presumed control over Courtot’s skiing. The dissent “fail[ed] to see how such
conduct reasonably can be considered within the control of Mohawk
[Mountain].”151 The dissenting opinion stated that an employee’s loss of
control was simply beyond the control of the ski resort; therefore, skiers
assume that risk.152 Furthermore, the dissent stated that the plain language of
the statute applied to this case, so the majority’s interpretation removing
assumption of risk from the statute was incorrect.153 The dissent concluded by
proposing another interpretation that allowed assumption of risk to remain in
the statute while still protecting the ski industry.154 Part V of this note clarifies
and builds on these points made by the dissent by including them in part of the
analysis.
V. Analysis
A. Examination of the Majority Opinion
This analysis argues four main points. First, the majority opinion correctly
decided that holding a preseason clinic is part of the operation of a ski area.
Second, even though the majority correctly decided the first issue, it erred by
recognizing an incorrect purpose of the ski tort reform statute in Connecticut.
Third, the court erred by placing too much faith in the Clover decision, and

148. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 828-29.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 833-35 (Borden, J., dissenting in part). The dissenting opinion also agreed with
the majority’s position on the second certified question concerning whether skiing was a contact
sport, and if so, whether recklessness was required to prove negligence. Id. at 834; see supra
note 90.
151. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 836 (Borden, J., dissenting in part).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 836-37.
154. Id. at 838-39.
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finally, the court erred by not basing its decision on the plain language of the
ski tort statute.
The court correctly found that a preseason clinic is part of the operation of
a ski area. Because the Connecticut legislature did not provide a statutory
definition of the phrase “operation of a ski area,” the Jagger court correctly
used outside sources to determine what “operation of a ski area” entails.155
The defendant ski operator wanted the court to determine that the preseason
clinic was outside the definition of “operation of a ski area” because the
legislature did not specifically enumerate a preseason clinic in the statute as it
did with other operations.156 Such an argument was not correct because the
Connecticut legislature could not possibly list every action that could be
considered part of the “operation of a ski area” in its statute. In fact, the statute
itself generally reflects such an idea by stating, “In the operation of a
passenger tramway or ski area, each operator shall have the obligation to
perform certain duties including, but not limited to . . . .”157 Consequently, the
court could look to the dictionary definition “[t]o ascertain the commonly
approved usage of the word” and find that “‘operation’ [includes] ‘the whole
process of . . . operating a business.’”158 Therefore, the majority’s opinion
correctly included the preseason clinic as part of the “operation of a ski area.”
Although the Connecticut Supreme Court was correct concerning a
preseason clinic’s inclusion as part of the operation of a ski area, the court
erred regarding the purpose of the Connecticut ski statutes because its analysis
does not conform with the true purpose behind the passage of the statutes.
After the Sunday decision, the ski area industry felt that Sunday constituted a
possible threat of financial ruin because of a higher level of liability and rising
insurance premiums.159 Consequently, the representatives of the ski industry
petitioned legislatures for a shield against this increased liability posturing that
skiers should assume the risks of certain types of dangers inherent in the sport
of skiing.160 The Jagger court, by stating that the ski statutes were in perfect
harmony with both the Wright and Sunday cases, negated the entire purpose
of the lobbyists who petitioned for legislative change on behalf of the ski
industry. The court’s analysis seems particularly suspect considering that
within three years of the Sunday decision, almost every state with a major ski
155. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
156. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 820 (majority opinion).
157. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-211 (2001) (emphasis added).
158. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 820 (quoting Gartrell v. Dep’t of Corr., 787 A.2d 541 (2002)).
159. Id. at 835; see supra note 67. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, The Causes of the
Insurance Crisis, 37 ACAD. POL. SCI. 76 (1988); I. William Berry, The Great Insurance Fallout,
SKI, Jan. 1989, at 45-51.
160. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 835.
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industry, as a response to the Sunday decision, passed or considered passing
legislation protecting each state’s respective ski industry.161 The lobbyists for
the ski industry and the legislature must have desired something more than a
mere codification of the already existing common law resulting from the
Sunday case.162 Otherwise, going to the legislature for a protective statute was
an exercise in futility because it was the common law that the ski industry
desired to change.
Despite the intent of the legislature, skiers injured by the negligence of ski
operators were not to be left without recourse. The legislature’s purpose in
passing the Connecticut ski statutes was to continue allowing recovery when
the negligence of ski area operators caused injuries to skiers, but not when the
injury was caused by an inherent risk of skiing.163 As stated earlier in this
note, the common law version of assumption of risk frustrates both of these
purposes — (1) protecting the ski industry by changing the previous common
law doctrine and (2) allowing recovery for the plaintiff when the ski provider
is negligent.164 The majority tried to reconcile the apparent disparity between
the common law assumption of risk and the ski statutes by stating that ski
resort liability should turn on whether the cause of injury was within the
control of the ski area provider.165
The court’s focus on “control” was misguided, however, because even the
most advanced skier may “catch an edge” and lose control, regardless of
training, experience, and supervision.166 Common knowledge demonstrates
that even experienced athletes, such as Olympians, fall often during
competition. With regard to an employee performing certain duties on skis,
it is impossible to say that the employee is under the control of the ski area
operator at all times because even the most experienced and well-trained skiers
may lose control. The majority’s reliance on “control” is flawed in this
instance because even the skier, the person supposedly in control of the skis
at all times, does not have absolute control when “catching an edge.”
Although the court correctly attempted to reconcile the disparity in the statute

161. Frakt & Rankin, supra note 4, at 248.
162. See supra note 67.
163. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 835.
164. As mentioned earlier the defendant still owed a duty under the statute, so it was not
primary assumption of the risk. Also, the statute was not secondary assumption of the risk
because it did not require that the plaintiff be aware of the defendant’s negligence before the
plaintiff chose to confront the known risk. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
165. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 835 (Borden, J., dissenting in part).
166. Dennis P. Mikko, Skiing with the Ski Area Safety Act, 78 MICH. B.J. 438, 439 (1999).
“Catching an edge” is when one of the skis turns suddenly in an unexpected direction. Id.
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regarding assumption of risk, its reliance on Mohawk Mountain’s presumed
control over Courtot at all times is not realistic.
The majority also erred by placing too much faith in the Utah Supreme
Court’s Clover decision. In Clover, the plaintiff contended, among other
things, that because the ski resort contained a “blind jump,” the negligent
design and maintenance of the ski resort caused the collision between the ski
resort’s employee and herself.167 The Clover plaintiff’s claim was not based
on an instantaneous loss of control on the part of a ski resort employee as
occurred in Jagger. The Clover allegation fits under the Jagger majority’s
control analysis because the design of a ski resort is definitely within the
control of a ski area provider. As discussed previously, however, the majority
in Jagger claimed that Courtot was under the presumed control of Mohawk
Mountain even though a ski area provider could not prevent an employee from
losing control on skis.168 This presumption, combined with the facts of the
Clover case, adds little to the majority’s argument because of the substantially
higher level of control ski resorts have over the design of their slopes
compared with the control they have over their employees while skiing down
those slopes. Therefore, the Clover decision does not further the majority’s
argument.
Further cutting against the majority’s reasoning is the plain language of the
statute. The statute plainly states that a skier assumes the risk of “collisions
with any other person by any skier while skiing . . . .”169 Such a scenario
applied directly to the incident which occurred between Jagger and Courtot.170
Simply put, Jagger collided with another skier while skiing, and the majority
should have used this fact and the language of the statute to bar recovery by
ruling in favor of Mohawk Mountain.
Additionally, as the dissenting opinion in Jagger stated:
[The] language must apply to this case, where the “other person”
is employed by the ski area, because if the other skier were not an
agent or employee of the ski area, the ski area operator would have
no legal responsibility for his negligence in the first place and,
hence, no need to be shielded from liability by the doctrine of
assumption of risk.171

167. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); see also Bigelow,
supra note 21, at 312.
168. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
169. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-212 (2001).
170. Id.
171. Jagger, 849 A.2d at 837 (Borden, J., dissenting in part).
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For example, in a similar hypothetical collision between Jagger and another
patron, the negligence cause of action would not involve an analysis of
Mohawk Mountain’s legal responsibility because there is no employeremployee relationship. The real problem with the majority’s analysis, which
the dissent identifies, is that it interprets assumption of risk out of the statute.172
The majority’s opinion stated that the negligence of an employee or agent is
not an inherent risk of skiing, but “every claim by an injured plaintiff will
necessarily arise out of the alleged negligence of an employee or agent of the
ski area.”173 Under the majority’s analysis, assumption of risk will essentially
never apply under a vicarious liability scenario because all negligence claims
will be the result of the actions of an employee or agent.174 In other words, all
vicarious-liability negligence claims would arise as a result of the acts of an
employee or agent of the ski operator.
As a result of its analysis, the majority’s decision completely thwarts the
legislature’s intent, which was to statutorily provide at least some relief to the
Connecticut ski industry.175 By preventing any negligence caused by an
employee or agent to be an assumed risk, ski area operators are now without
the use of assumption of risk as a defense to vicarious liability — a result
hardly intended by the passage the Connecticut ski act.
B. Suggestions for Reform
The attempt at reform in Connecticut took a legislative form, which enjoys
certain advantages. For instance, “a statute defining duties of operator and
participant, and spelling out the scope of inherent risks, informs the respective
parties of their future obligations.”176 On the other hand, legislative reform
presents several problems. The first was demonstrated in Jagger. If the statute
includes a non-exclusive list of what risks skiers assume, which most statutes
do because of the numerous possibilities of injury that may occur, then neither
side can realistically predict the outcome of a case because the trier of fact
must decide if a particular set of facts falls within the assumption of risk
named in the statute.177 Second, a statutory list of assumed risks may not take
into account the advances in technology that lower the risk associated with the
sport of skiing.178 For example, the Wright court held that an object concealed

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 191.
Id.
Id.
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by snow was an inherent risk while the Sunday court held that it was not
inherent.179 The distinction that the Sunday court made concerning Wright
relates to the disadvantage of a static statute and its inability to account for
possible changes in skiing technology. The Sunday court stated that new
technology allowed for better grooming techniques, and thus, concealed brush
was not something that a skier assumed as a risk.180 Finally, the legislature
may draft a poorly written statute, which could make the application of the
statute impractical because the judiciary would have difficulty understanding
the intent of the legislature.181
Because of these problems, Connecticut might want to consider a different
type of reform. Wyoming has taken a judicial approach, rather than a
legislative approach, to tort reform of inherently dangerous activities such as
skiing.182 A judicial-approach statute does not list duties and risks like the
Connecticut legislative-approach statute; instead, the statute allows the
judiciary to determine if the operator owes a legal duty.183 This approach uses
common law principles to determine the nature of the risk and the ski area
provider’s duty.184 For example, the Wyoming state courts use the following
eight factors to determine if a ski area provider has a legal duty: (1) the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent
of the burden upon the defendant; (7) the consequences to the community and
the court system; and (8) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.185 In other words, Wyoming state courts use a common law
balancing test to determine if a legal duty exists.
Applying these eight factors to the facts of Jagger yields the result that the
Connecticut ski industry desired from the legislative process.186 First, Jagger
could foresee the possibility that she might run into another skier while skiing,
even a skier who is an employee of the ski resort. Second, a close connection
existed between the defendant’s conduct and the injuries suffered, but the
defendant’s purpose in instructing its employees was to provide better service
179. See supra Part II.A-B.
180. Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398, 402 (Vt. 1978); see also Frakt & Rankin, supra
note 4, at 243.
181. Hansen & Duerr, supra note 7, at 191.
182. Id. at 173-90.
183. Id. at 172.
184. Id. at 191-92.
185. Id. at 190.
186. Id. at 189-90.
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and a safer skiing environment. This proper purpose, therefore, outweighs the
close connection of the injury. Third, the plaintiff obviously suffered injuries.
Fourth, Courtot’s loss of control while skiing downhill probably is not morally
blameworthy — unless he intentionally ran into Jagger. Jagger, however,
never alleged that Courtot’s conduct was intentional. Fifth, having a welltrained staff prevents future harm by allowing the staff members to help
patrons as they navigate the slopes. For example, Courtot, as a well-trained
staff member, would be better able to respond to an injured skier or direct the
ski traffic on the slopes so that patrons enjoyed a safer ski environment. Sixth,
if the ski resort did not hold preseason clinics to train its staff members, it
might suffer a huge financial burden because of the loss of business coupled
with increased insurance costs which are both associated with undertrained
staff members. Well-trained staff members perform two functions that
promote economic gain: (1) they serve the patrons, and good service ensures
that the patrons return; and (2) they help those who become injured, and even
prevent injuries which reduces insurance costs. Seventh, without a welltrained staff, the community would suffer for the reasons previously listed.
Finally, a poorly-trained staff might actually increase insurance premiums
because a poorly-trained staff might create situations that impose increased
risk on the ski area providers. In conclusion, running into another skier was
foreseeable and because training employees is essential to the running of a ski
resort, ski resorts like Mohawk Mountain should not be liable when one of its
employees happens to lose control while performing onsite training.
A judicial approach to tort reform, however, may not be more desirable than
a legislative one. Because of the natural inconsistency by courts in applying
these common-law factors, a judicial approach may not decrease the
uncertainty of outcomes in cases like Jagger. Uncertainty was one of the
issues the ski area providers sought a resolution to when they approached the
Connecticut legislature concerning ski tort reform. Perhaps a solution would
be for the legislature to simply draft a new statute that precisely protects the
ski resort under the facts presented by the Jagger case, but such legislation sets
a cumbersome precedent that requires the legislature to pass a new law
anytime a particular factual situation caused a problem of interpretation. After
all, how many different ways may an individual be hurt while skiing?
Because of the difficulties of both a legislative and a judicial approach to
tort reform, perhaps the dissent’s position is an appropriate compromise. The
dissent’s interpretation allows for liability based on the negligence of the ski
area provider and states that the assumption of risk doctrine should still apply
when the skier assumes risks inherent in the sport of skiing.187 The dissent’s
187. Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 849 A.2d 813, 838 (Conn. 2004) (Borden,
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interpretation rests on the idea that a claim of negligence must, by its nature,
be related to something intrinsically a part of the operation of a ski area, such
as conducting a preseason clinic.188 Therefore, while a preseason clinic is part
of operating a ski area, “an instantaneous loss of control by a ski instructor on
the slopes does not fall within the type of conduct that is covered” by the
statute.189 For example, if Jagger’s claim had been that the preseason clinic
was negligently placed in an area of the slope where a skier was likely to run
into those participating in the ski instruction, then the claim should stand. An
employee’s loss of control through no fault of the ski resort, however, is not
related to the ski area provider’s duties listed in the Connecticut statutes, and
therefore, the Connecticut Supreme Court should have dismissed the case.
Thus, the dissent is advocating a pragmatic position that removes some of the
inconsistency of applying the common law in a judicial approach to tort reform
while still allowing latitude from the strictures of statutory language associated
with a legislative approach.
VI. Conclusion
The ski area providers’ purpose in seeking legislation was to protect
themselves from the apparent new liability created by the decision of the
Sunday case. The providers wanted to change the common law. The court in
Jagger implicitly stated that changing the common law was not the purpose
behind the passage of the statute when the court announced that the legislation
merely codified the existing common law. Additionally, its interpretation of
the statute removed assumption of risk from the analysis. Connecticut and
other states with similar statutes, whose judiciaries may follow a similar
interpretation of Jagger, have a choice to make: (1) they can either create a
judicial approach to assumption of risk in the skiing context; (2) they can draft
a new statute that would more precisely answer the issue presented by Jagger;
or (3) they can encourage their judiciary to interpret the statute to allow for
claims of negligent operation, but still retain the concept of assumption of risk.
Each scenario has positive and negative aspects, but one thing is for certain:
with the amount of money that is generated by the ski industry for its
respective states, the legislatures will more than likely be willing to help
anytime a perceived threat of higher liability exists. At least in the state of
Connecticut, increased liability now exists because of Jagger, and if history
holds true to the lobbying actions that occurred as result of Sunday, then the
Connecticut ski industry will react. The question remains, however, will the
J., dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 839.
189. Id. (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/5

2006]

NOTES

181

judiciary allow tort-reform legislation to change the common law or will it
simply interpret the new statute as a codification of common law? In the case
of Connecticut’s ski industry, past history points to the latter.
Joel Bulleigh
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